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ABSTRACT
This Article explores how private governance can reduce the climate
effects of global civil aviation. The civil aviation sector is a major
contributor to climate change, accounting for emissions comparable to
a top ten emitting country. National and international governmental
bodies have taken important steps to address civil aviation, but the
measures adopted to date are widely acknowledged to be inadequate.
Civil aviation poses particularly difficult challenges for government
climate mitigation efforts. Many civil aviation firms operate globally,
emissions often occur outside of national boundaries, nations differ on
their respective responsibilities, and demand is growing rapidly.
Although promising new technologies are emerging, they will take
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time to develop and adopt. This Article argues that private initiatives
can overcome many of these barriers. Private initiatives can motivate
civil aviation firms to act absent government pressure at the national
level and can create pressure for mitigation that transcends national
boundaries. The Article argues that it is time to develop a private
climate governance agenda for civil aviation and identifies examples
of the types of existing and new initiatives that could be included in
the effort. If public and private policymakers can overcome the
tendency to focus almost exclusively on public governance, private
initiatives can yield large and prompt emissions reductions from global
civil aviation, buy time for more comprehensive government
measures, and complement the government measures when they occur.
INTRODUCTION
Fuel use accounts for roughly a third of an airline’s operating costs,
so it is fair to assume that airlines are motivated to achieve high levels
of fuel efficiency.1 Yet it was not until Virgin Atlantic Airlines began
studying its carbon footprint with the help of a non-profit group and
several University of Chicago economists that its managers realized
how simply providing fuel use information to pilots could reduce fuel
use and carbon emissions while saving large amounts of money.2 What
motivated Virgin Atlantic to act after overlooking this major cost
savings for decades? Although Virgin Atlantic may have been
anticipating government regulatory limits on aircraft carbon emissions
in the distant future, it was also subject to pressure for carbon
emissions reductions from advocacy groups, investors pushing for
disclosure of carbon emissions, and the public climate statements of
its founder, Sir Richard Branson.3
1. Greer K. Gosnell et al., A New Approach to an Age-Old Problem: Solving
Externalities by Incenting Workers Directly 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 22316, 2016) (2–3%), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22316
[https://perma.cc/X647-2VES] (“[F]uel use in the industry affects profits—fuel
represents an average 33% of [airlines’] operating costs”).
2. See id.
3. Fiona Harvey, Richard Branson leads call to free global economy from
carbon emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/feb/05/richard-branson-net-zero-emissions-target-businesses
[https://perma.cc/M7UN-L4KC]. For example, in 2015 Branson was quoted saying
that “[s]etting a net-zero GHG emissions target by 2050 will drive innovation, grow
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This symposium focuses on the growing importance of private
environmental governance.4 In recent years, private governance
initiatives have begun to focus on climate change,5 and in this Article
we explore how private initiatives can address the carbon emissions of
civil aviation firms such as Virgin Atlantic.6 Civil aviation is a
significant contributor to climate change. The sector accounts for
roughly two percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, an amount
comparable to one of the highest-emitting nations, and its contribution
is expected to grow. Although existing and new technologies can
reduce the sector’s emissions, a number of barriers prevent rapid
uptake of these technologies.7 In addition, government measures face
substantial barriers.8 Much of civil aviation is international, which
leaves national and subnational governments ill-suited to reduce its
effects. Intergovernmental organizations are attempting to respond,
but these organizations face collective action problems and have
limited capacity to enforce environmental standards against noncompliant actors. Their efforts have resulted in the Carbon Offsetting
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which is
an important achievement for the international process. The goal of
jobs, build prosperity and secure a better world for what will soon be 9 billion people.
Why would we wait any longer to do that?” Id. at 2.
4. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146 (2013) (defining private environmental governance as
“actions taken by non-governmental entities that are designed to achieve traditionally
governmental ends such as managing the exploitation of common pool resources,
increasing the provisions of public goods, reducing environmental externalities, or
more justly distributing environmental amenities.”); Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts,
Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 1, 3 (2015) (defining private environmental governance as “the
traditionally ‘governmental’ functions of environmental standard setting and
enforcement that private actors, including business firms and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), adopt to address environmental concerns.”).
5. See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017).
6. In this Article, we refer to the carbon emissions from civil aviation as a
shorthand way to refer to not only the greenhouse gas emissions attributable to the
civil aviation sector, but also the other ways in which the sector contributes to
increases in global average temperature, such as through the creation of contrails.
See discussion infra Part I.B. The Effect of Climate Change on Civil Aviation.
7. See infra Part II.A. Challenges to International Public Governance.
8. See infra Part II.B. International Initiatives.
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CORSIA, however, is modest: to freeze net emissions at 2020 levels,
largely through the use of carbon offsets.
Private environmental governance initiatives—non-governmental
actions that pursue traditionally governmental objectives like
managing consumption of common resources, increasing public
goods, and reducing negative externalities—often use private forms of
common governmental instruments (e.g., information disclosure
requirements, performance requirements, carbon taxes, and others)9
and are tackling many of the same subject matter areas as government
environmental regulatory programs.10 These private initiatives can
play an important role in reducing civil aviation’s carbon emissions,
buying time for more substantial efforts to become politically viable
and complementing government regulatory efforts when they do.
Rather than depending on the coercive power or resources of any
nation, group of nations, or subnational government, private initiatives
can harness the support for climate mitigation among investors,
lenders, retail and corporate customers, employees, managers, and
others.11 As the Virgin Atlantic experience suggests, private actors can
motivate civil aviation firms to act and provide the expertise necessary
for firms to do so in an effective way. These efforts are often facilitated
by organizational self-interest, since many climate mitigation
initiatives will not only respond to demands from stakeholders, but
also will yield lower energy and other costs. Maximizing fuel
efficiency, for example, is often in an airline’s self-interest. Of course,
unobserved costs may be a barrier,12 and the motivations of
corporations and other private sector organizations are complex, but
the literature on private ordering provides reason for optimism.
Greenwashing—a false claim of pro-environmental action—is a risk,
but private initiatives that target civil aviation’s carbon emissions also
9. See Light & Orts, supra note 4, at 23–52 (noting parallel instruments).
10. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 4, at 146; see

also Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance,
in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(Robert Glicksman & LeRoy Paddock eds., 2016) (noting parallel instruments and
subject matters).
11. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 41
COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 217 (2015).
12. See Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Drivers
of Corporate Climate Mitigation, ENVTL. F. 29 (Jan.–Feb. 2018), at 29.
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can exceed expectations and can have positive spillover effects on
government programs, building support for and reducing the cost of
public governance.13
Part I provides context about the climate effects of civil aviation by
describing the sector’s current contributions to climate forcing,
expected growth, and the options for reducing those contributions. Part
II analyzes challenges that stand in the way of government civil
aviation climate efforts and describes existing government efforts. Part
III explains why private governance initiatives can bypass some of the
obstacles that discourage government action, suggests development of
a private climate governance agenda for civil aviation, and provides
examples of specific private initiatives that can reduce the sector’s
carbon emissions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Contributions of Civil Aviation to Climate Change
Following guidance from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), the Environmental Protection Agency distinguishes
between civil, military, and general aviation.14 Civil aviation includes
“[e]missions from international and domestic civil aviation, including
take-offs and landings . . . [and c]omprises civil commercial use of
airplanes, including: scheduled and charter traffic for passengers and
freight, air taxiing, and general aviation,” military aviation is
comprised of all aircraft under control of the armed forces, and general
aviation refers to recreational and small corporate aircraft.15 In 2015,
civil aviation accounted for 119 out of a national total of 157.7 million

13. For a discussion of an example of private governance initiative that exceeded
expectations, see discussion infra at note 189 (discussing Walmart’s reduction of 28
million tons of carbon emissions following a commitment to achieve 20 million
tons).
14. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2015 3–94 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-02/documents/2017_complete_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PFY4-BWRG] [hereinafter U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY].
15. See IPCC, 2006 IPCC GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INVENTORIES (Vol.1 at 8.12) (2006), https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/
2006gl/pdf/1_Volume1/V1_8_Ch8_Reporting_Guidance.pdf; see also id.
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tons of jet fuel consumed in the United States.16 During the same year
military aircraft consumed 14.7 million tons of jet fuel and general
aviation used roughly 24 million tons.17
In this Article we focus on global civil aviation, and we focus in
particular on passenger travel rather than freight transport in our
discussion of private initiatives in Part III.18 Civil aviation as a whole
plays a critical role in the global economy. On a global basis, three and
a half billion passengers travelled across a distance of nearly four
trillion miles in 2015.19 Sixty percent of these passengers flew
internationally.20 The fleet that transports these passengers is made up
of over twenty-six thousand aircraft operated by more than one
thousand commercial airlines.21 The availability of rapid, reliable air
transport facilitates economic activity worldwide and is supported by
nearly four thousand airports serving commercial flights.22 Although
industry groups rightly point out that civil aviation is “essential for
global business” and that it “plays a vital role in facilitating economic
growth, particularly in developing countries,” the industry also
acknowledges its significant and complex contribution to climate
change.23
In 2015, civil aviation worldwide emitted around 781 million tons
of carbon dioxide, representing about 2% of all human carbon dioxide
emissions.24 As we mentioned at the outset, if civil aviation were a
16. U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY, supra note 14, at 3–24.
17. Id.
18. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. Although civil aviation is not

responsible for all aircraft emissions, it represents the most significant component of
the aviation total. Later in this Article we discuss options that can reduce carbon
emissions from aircraft themselves as well as from ground infrastructure, and we use
the term civil aviation to refer to both portions of the sector together. Where this
Article discusses carbon mitigation options that are available only to firms that
transport freight and passengers by aircraft, we refer to those firms as airlines, as
opposed to, for example, ground services or renewable fuel manufacturing firms.
19. AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP (ATAG), AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND
BORDERS 5 (2016) [hereinafter AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND BORDERS].
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5, 7.
24. Id. at 7. Estimates of aviation’s total global emissions vary, but are typically
in the range of 1.5 to 3%. See, e.g., Janina D. Scheelhaase & Wolfgang G. Grimme,
Emissions Trading for International Aviation—An Estimation of the Economic

68

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

nation, it would be a top-ten carbon dioxide emitter, roughly equal to
all of Germany’s carbon emissions from fuel combustion.25 Within the
European Union, civil aviation emissions constitute 3% of greenhouse
gas emissions.26 In 2013, civil aviation wholly within, or originating
within in the United States comprised 29% of global civil aviation
emissions and 3% of the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions.27
Although three percent may seem like a small percentage, the climate
problem is caused by many types of sources, most of which can claim
to be small contributors on their own, yet achieving carbon mitigation
targets will require emissions reductions from many of these sources.28
Mitigating carbon emissions is particularly important because even
though a significant portion of the emissions from civil aviation are
absorbed into the ocean and taken up by plants,29 the carbon that
Impact on Selected European Airlines, 13 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 253 (2007)
(“[B]etween 2.5 and 3%.”); ROB BAILIS, DERIK BROEKHOFF & CARRIE M. LEE,
STOCKHOLM ENVTL. INST., SUPPLY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF CARBON OFFSETS AND
ALTERNATIVE FUELS FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 1 (2016) (“International
aviation produced . . . in 2013, about 1.5% of global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel
combustion . . . .”); Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1.
25. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/
science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html#.WO4o24jyuUk [https://perma.cc/EA9XECVQ]; AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 19. These figures
compare carbon dioxide emitted by civil aviation with national totals for fuel
consumption. See infra Appendix A, p. 97.
26. STEVAN TRUXAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 126 (2017). The European Environmental Agency
reported that civil aviation in the European Union in 2014 emitted 15,379 kilotons
of carbon dioxide. EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY, ANNUAL EUROPEAN
UNION GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY 1990–2014 AND INVENTORY REPORT 2016 at
xi
(2016),
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/annual-european-uniongreenhouse-gas/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/KAH2-QBXW].
27. Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Aircraft, CENTER FOR CLIMATE
AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/reducing-carbon-dioxideemissions-from-aircraft/ [http://perma.cc/7TZH-3FU3] (last visited July 10, 2018).
28. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (2011) (examining how climate change’s
global scale renders most individual sources small percentages of the whole;
accordingly, climate mitigation efforts will need to address many individually-minor
contributors).
29. David W. Fahey & David S. Lee, Aviation and Climate Change: A Scientific
Perspective, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 97, 98 (2016).
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remains in the atmosphere can linger for thousands of years.30 Further,
these emissions are not limited to carbon dioxide. High temperature
combustion in jet engines creates nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide,
primarily at cruising altitude.31 In the presence of sunlight, these
nitrogen compounds react in ways that increase atmospheric ozone but
decrease the presence of methane.32 Less methane results in less
warming, but the increase in ozone outweighs this benefit, resulting in
a net warming effect.33 Aviation injects sulfur compounds into the
atmosphere as well, since sulfur is typically present in aviation fuels at
around 400–600ppm.34 Further, aviation emissions are distinctive
relative to the same compounds emitted from other industries. Unlike
nearly every other anthropogenic source of carbon, most aviation
emissions are emitted directly into the atmosphere high above the
earth’s surface.35 Aviation emissions are more damaging than they
would be at sea level because nitrogen compounds are converted to
ozone more efficiently at high altitudes, and because aircraft produce
contrails.36
Contrails are formed when warm water vapor in a jet’s plume of
exhaust is emitted into cold, moist air.37 As the exhaust expands and
cools, water droplets condense and freeze.38 If the surrounding

30. Id. It should be noted however, that carbon dioxide absorbed into the oceans
increases their acidity, which has a significant effect on marine ecosystems
worldwide.
31. See id. (“[H]igh temperatures of combustion lead to the formation and
emission of nitrogen species.”); U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY, supra note 14,
at 3–94 (“In jet engines, N2O is primarily produced by the oxidation of atmospheric
nitrogen, and the majority of emissions occur during the cruise phase.”).
32. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 98
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. David S. Lee et al., Aviation and Global Climate Change in the 21st Century,
43 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 3520 (2009) (“[T]he largest fraction of [aviation’s]
emissions are injected at aircraft cruise altitudes of 8–12 km. At these altitudes, the
emissions have increased effectiveness to cause chemical and aerosol effects relevant
to climate forcing.”).
36. See David S. Lee, Aviation and Climate Change: The Science, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND AVIATION: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 27, 41 (Stefan
Gössling & Paul Upham eds., 2009).
37. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 100.
38. Id.
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atmosphere is dry, contrails dissipate quickly.39 But in conditions with
enough ambient atmospheric water vapor, background water can
condense onto those frozen droplets, resulting in persistent linear
clouds that are formed behind each of an aircraft’s jet engines.40 These
clouds can persist for hours after formation, eventually blending with
existing clouds.41 High-level clouds like these have both cooling and
warming effects: They reflect incoming solar radiation and trap
escaping terrestrial radiation, but their effect on the latter is larger over
the long term.42 Consequently, increasing contrail-based clouds
increases the heat that is trapped in the atmosphere.43 In fact, a 1999
special report on civil aviation and climate change by the IPCC noted
that aviation’s role in cloud formation may have a climate changing
effect comparable to all of the industry’s carbon emissions.44 More
recent work has supported the assessment that contrails are a
significant component of civil aviation’s climate impact,45 and under
current projections radiative forcing from contrail-induced cloudiness
could increase seven-fold by 2050.46
The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 gave
scientists an opportunity to shed further light on the effect of civil
aviation on climate by allowing them to examine the effect of almost
39. Hermann Mannstein & Ulrich Schumann, Aircraft Induced Contrail Cirrus
Over Europe, 14 METEOROLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 549 (2005).
40. Victoria Williams et al., Reducing the Climate Change Impacts of Aviation
by Restricting Cruise Altitudes, 7 TRANSP. RES. PART D 451 (2002).
41. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 100.
42. Williams et al., supra note 41, at 451.
43. Id.
44. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AVIATION AND THE
GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 7 (1999) (showing nearly
equal radiative forcing changes derived carbon dioxide emissions and contrail
formation).
45. Fahey & Lee, supra note 30, at 101 (concluding, based on data from 2005,
that of all of aviation’s radiative forcing impacts, increased total cloudiness is the
most significant); see also Bo Zou et al., Optimal 4-D Aircraft Trajectories in a
Contrail-Sensitive Environment, 16 NETWORKS & SPATIAL ECON. 415 (2016)
(“While a number of studies have examined the climate impact of persistent contrails
with varying estimated results, the general conclusion is that the magnitude of
contrail climate impact is non-negligible comparable to that of CO2.”).
46. Chih-Chieh Chen & Andrew Gettelman, Simulated 2015 Aviation Radiative
Forcing from Contrails and Aerosols, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS
7317 (2016).
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entirely halting civil aviation for several days. United States airports
handled 38,047 flights on September 10; on the twelfth, 252.47
Commercial aircraft were grounded for three days following the
attack.48 Early research into the effect of that grounding suggested that
the absence of contrails had a predictable influence—because these
clouds block some incoming solar radiation in the short term but
prevent some energy from escaping over the long term, removing
contrails can be expected to increase temperature in the near term.49
Not surprisingly, during the grounding period daily temperature ranges
across the United States increased by about 1.1°C above historic
averages.50 Although subsequent research has pointed out that the
specific effects observed during those three days were also explainable
by natural variation and other weather factors,51 the changes observed
during that period suggest that even though contrails are not the sole
driver of cloud-induced temperature changes, they may play an
important role.52
47. THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ON AVIATION, INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 2 (2011), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/Documents/
impact-9-11-aviation.pdf.
48. David Travis et al., Contrails Reduce Daily Temperature Range 418 NATURE
601 (2002).
49. Air-traffic moratorium opened window on contrails and climate (August 8,
2002) NATURE.COM, http://www.nature.com/news/2002/020808/full/news0208057.html [https://perma.cc/J66F-A5M7].
50. Travis et al., supra note 49.
51. See Gang Hong et al., Do Contrails Significantly Reduce Daily Temperature
Range? 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS (“While missing contrails may have
affected the DTR, their impact is probably too small to detect with a statistical
significance.”). But cf. Simone Dietmüller et al., Contrails, Natural Clouds, and
Diurnal Temperature Range 21 J. CLIMATE 5061 (2008) (“Although a radiative
cooling of contrails during the day and a warming during the night is reproduced by
the climate model simulation with enhanced contrails, we could not find any
significant decrease in DTR in the multiyear simulations including contrails, even
when enhancing the contrail effect to level much higher than expected . . . .”).
52. David Travis, the author of one of the earliest studies on climate effects of
the September 11 groundings has pointed out that subsequent studies do not disprove
this core understanding of how contrails effect climate. The Hong et al. study, for
example, studied the effect of high-level cloudiness in general, and did not separate
out contrails specifically. See Anna Barnett, Can aircraft trails affect climate?, (Dec.
31, 2008) NATURE, http://www.nature.com/news/2008/081231/full/news.2008.
1335.html [https://perma.cc/YR6Y-23XA] (discussing Hong et al., supra note 52).
In addition, although longer-term studies show that variations as significant as what
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In addition, although estimates vary, the consensus is that civil
aviation will continue to grow rapidly. In its 2016–2035 Market
Outlook, Boeing forecast that airline traffic will increase 4.8% by
2033, and that long-term demand will call for 39,620 new airplanes.53
The Federal Aviation Administration forecast that the U.S.
commercial fleet will grow at 1% annually, adding over 1,500 new
aircrafts by 2036.54 Rapid growth in the number of passengers and the
size of commercial fleets corresponds to large projected increases in
emissions. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
reported in 2009 that by 2050 global civil aviation will consume 880
MT of jet fuel.55 Thus under a business-as-usual scenario, 2050
emissions could be triple what they are today.56
B. The Effect of Climate Change on Civil Aviation
In the previous section we examined several ways in which aviation
contributes to climate change. But the relationship between aviation
and climate change is further complicated by the ways in which
climate change will affect aviation. Climate change will alter the civil
aviation industry in many ways, but risks to airports and changes in
aircraft performance are among the most salient.57

Travis et al. observed can occur through natural processes, those variations are
extraordinarily rare and unlikely to account for the 2001 observations. Id.
53. BOEING, CURRENT MARKET OUTLOOK 2016–2035 2 (2016), http://www.
boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/about-our-market/assets/
downloads/cmo_print_2016_final_updated.pdf.
54. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS
2016–2036 28 (2016), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_
forecasts/media/FY2016-36_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf.
55. Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Global Aviation CO2 Emissions Projections
to 2050, ICAO Doc. GIACC/4-IP/1 (May 20, 2009), http://www.icao.int/
environmental-protection/GIACC/Giacc-4/Giacc4_ip01_en.pdf.
56. Parth Vaishnav, ICAO’s Market Based Mechanism: Keep it Simple, 10
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 120, 120 (2016) (“If the impact of alternative fuels is
not accounted for, CO2 emissions from aviation are likely to grow by between 40%
and 300% between now and 2050.”).
57. For a systematic overview of the distinct ways in which different sectors of
aviation industry will be affected, see Terence R. Thompson, Climate Change
Impacts Upon the Commercial Air Transport Industry: An Overview, 10 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 105 (2016).
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Sea-level rise and increased storm frequency threaten low-lying
airports by adding to the risk that storm events will cause airports to
be modified, shut down, or relocated. A quarter of the largest airports
in the United States are already vulnerable to moderate to high storm
surge.58 At least thirty European airports are similarly vulnerable, and
many more airports worldwide may be as well.59 Increased average
temperatures also increase the fire hazard of stored aviation fuel, which
has a flash point of about 100°F.60 A comprehensive assessment of
climate risks at London’s Heathrow Airport determined that
temperatures exceeding aviation fuel’s flashpoint pose a significant
risk in 2020–2050.61
Climate change will also have major effects on flight performance.
For example, as air temperature increases it becomes less dense,
causing a wing traveling through it to generate less lift than it would
in cooler, denser air.62 As a result, takeoff speeds must be increased.63
Since airport runway lengths vary, aircraft will not always be able to
achieve the speed necessary to take off at their maximum weight.64
These disruptions can also occur even when flights are not cancelled;
for example, on a 92°F day at Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport, a Boeing 737-800 will have to reduce its weight to 15,000
pounds below maximum to take off.65 For a cross-country flight this
weight restriction represents a thirty percent reduction in payload
capacity66—and based on FAA guidelines for average passenger

58. Id. at 107 (“[I]n the United States more than 25% of the largest airports have
at least one runway with an elevation within the reach of moderate to high storm
surge. Sea level rise will pose a threat to low-lying infrastructure . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 108–09.
61. HEATHROW AIRPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION REPORTING POWER
REPORT 88 (2011), http://www.heathrow.com/file_source/Company/Static/PDF/
Communityandenvironment/LHR-climate-change-adaptation-report.pdf.
62. See E. Coffle & R. Horton, Climate Change and the Impact of Extreme
Temperatures on Aviation, 7 WEATHER, CLIMATE & SOC’Y 94, 94 (2015).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 95.
66. Id. at 97.
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weight, this could mean seventy-nine fewer passengers.67 2017 saw
extreme heat forcing airlines to cancel some flights entirely in the
United States.68 As climate change increases the number of very hot
days each summer, weight restrictions will become more common,
severe, and disruptive.
In addition, flight times and turbulence are expected to increase. A
2016 study examining flights between New York and London
concluded that as carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases, average
flight times increase.69 Although changes in the jet stream will make
eastbound flights shorter, they will lengthen westbound flights at a
greater rate, thus increasing the average time and fuel consumed on
each trip.70 A similar phenomenon has been observed in average flight
times across the Pacific, where changes in wind speeds widen the time
difference between inbound and outbound flights asymmetrically,
netting more flying time and more fuel consumed.71 The intensity of
turbulence along the same flight path is expected to increase by ten to
67. The FAA estimates that the summer weight of an adult passenger, including
their carry-on baggage and personal items, is 190lbs—accounting for bulkier winter
clothing, winter passengers average 195lbs. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRCRAFT
WEIGHT AND BALANCE CONTROL, AC 120-27E tbl. 2-1 (June 10, 2005).
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC120-27E.pdf.
68. Zach Wichter, Too Hot to Fly? Climate Change May Take a Toll on Air
Travel, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/business/
flying-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/24TR-H4VB].
69. Paul D. Williams, Transatlantic Flight Times and Climate Change, 11
ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 024008 (2016).
70. Id.; see also Soo Kim, Climate change ‘to increase turbulence, flight times
and fares’, TELEGRAPH (May 12, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/
climate-change-to-increase-turbulence-flight-times-and-costs/
[https://perma.cc/6KU7-QCGN] (reporting that Williams’ key finding was that
“aircraft on transatlantic routes were collectively projected to ‘be airborne for an
extra 2,000 hours a year, burning an extra 7.2 million gallons of jet fuel’ and emit an
‘extra 70 million kilograms of carbon dioxide.’”).
71. Kristopher B. Karnauskas et al., Coupling Between Air Travel and Climate,
5 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 1068, 1069 (2015) (“Although the relationship between
westbound and eastbound flight times is inverse and strong, a closer look at the total
round-trip flying time by route . . . reveals a small but significant round-trip
residual.”); see also Justin Worland, How Climate Change Could Make Your Flights
Longer, TIME (Jul. 14, 2015), http://time.com/3957203/climate-change-flight-time/
[https://perma.cc/AC8E-P5V6] (“Flights over the Pacific Ocean have gotten longer
due to climate change-related changes in wind patterns, a shift that could be mirrored
in other regions across the globe . . . .”).
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forty percent by the middle of the century, and its frequency could
increase by 40–170%.72
C. Pathways to Reducing the Climate Effects of Aviation
Although civil aviation currently generates contrails and substantial
emissions, a range of measures can mitigate its effects. Most of these
measures are designed to reduce fuel consumption and thereby reduce
the emissions that are produced when aviation fuels are used. Because
fuel accounts for about a third of an airline’s operating cost, civil
aviation firms already have incentives to operate efficiently, but a
range of market, organizational, and behavioral barriers may exist.73
The result, as suggested by the Virgin Atlantic example, is that a
surprisingly large gap exists between the current state of the industry
and full realization of all cost-effective efficiency measures.74
In this Section I.C we describe several possible actions that could
reduce civil aviation’s contribution to climate change, regardless of
whether the actor driving the action is public or private. The purpose
of this description is not to calculate the specific extent of each
opportunity,75 but rather to highlight the types of opportunities that
exist and demonstrate that fully adopting them would yield a
meaningful reduction in emissions. We then turn to the actors who
could induce the civil aviation sector to seize these opportunities. We
72. Paul D. Williams & Manoj M. Joshi, Intensification of Winter Transatlantic
Aviation Turbulence in Response to Climate Change, 3 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 644,
646 (2013).
73. Vaishnav, supra note 57, at 121; See also Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1.
74. See, e.g., infra, Subsection. III.B.2. (describing a Virgin Atlantic study on
pilot behaviors that have an effect on how much fuel is consumed on a given flight).
75. Some of the measures that we describe in this section overlap in technically
complex ways which are beyond the scope of this Article. For example, lower
cruising altitudes have been suggested as a way to reduce contrail formation. But
operating at a lower altitude forces aircraft to travel through a denser portion of the
atmosphere, expend more energy doing so, and therefore consume more fuel to
obtain that energy. Similarly, travelling north–south at sunrise and sunset can reduce
contrail formation, but in many cases would also increase a flight’s total distance.
See Judith Rosenow, Optical Properties of Condensation Trails (Oct. 6, 2016)
(unpublished Dr.-Ing. dissertation, Technische Universität Dresden), https://www.
researchgate.net/profile/Judith_Rosenow/publication/309464261_Optical_
Properties_of_Condensation_Trails/links/5811cdd108aec29d99f779fb/OpticalProperties-of-Condensation-Trails.pdf.
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discuss public governance responses in Part II and private governance
responses in Part III.
1. Efficient Operations
Increasing the efficiency of operational measures is one of the most
promising avenues through which civil aviation emissions can be
reduced. Operational measures generally work within existing
infrastructure and design constraints, and some can be adopted very
quickly. The Virgin Atlantic study examined the role that pilot
incentives can play on fuel use during flights, finding that pilots have
significant control over how efficiently they operate and that they can
be incentivized to do so.76 In the study, researchers observed the
behaviors of 335 Virgin Atlantic captains with regard to three behavior
modifications through which the pilots could influence fuel
efficiency.77
The researchers first examined pre-flight decisions about how much
fuel an aircraft would carry on its route.78 Prior to each flight, pilots
use their professional judgment to adjust the amount of fuel that the
aircraft will ultimately carry, based on the final weight of the aircraft.79
This allows the pilot to prevent excess fuel from being loaded onto the
aircraft, thereby reducing the flight’s overall weight, and the energy
necessary to transport it to its destination.80 The study next measured
whether pilots are making fuel efficient choices during flight,
including obtaining optimum altitudes and any feasible shortcuts from
air traffic control, adjusting speed, responding optimally to changing
weather, and making efficient choices about flap settings and landing
gear. Finally, pilots have control over whether to shut down one or
more engines during taxiing, thereby further reducing a flight’s total
gate-to-gate fuel intensity.81 The study found that simply having these
efficiency behaviors observed combined with a variety of other pilot
incentives produced a nearly eight thousand metric ton reduction in
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Gosnell et al., supra note 1.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Thomas Schilling, Thomas Rötger & Kai Wicke, Assessment of the
Impact of Radically Climate-Friendly Aviation Technologies at 8 (2016), http://elib.
dlr.de/106658/1/2016_GreenerAviation_Paper_AIRCAT_20160906.pdf.
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fuel use during an eight-month period, representing over twenty four
thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide not emitted by Virgin
Atlantic.82
In addition to the actions just described, a wide range of other
operational efficiencies can decrease the carbon consequences of civil
aviation. Reduced thrust takeoff can lower fuel consumption by up to
23.2%, and can reduce nitric oxide and black carbon emissions to an
even greater extent.83 Traditional flight plans direct a pilot to reduce
altitude in steps, requiring engine thrust at each stage of the descent,84
but a continuous descent can reduce fuel consumption during descent
by 27%.85 New technologies like the NASA’s Efficient Descent
Advisor enable air traffic controllers to synchronize the descent of
incoming aircraft, allowing them to glide through their descent while
consuming minimal fuel.86
2. Efficient Technologies
New aircraft are being designed in ways that make them, on average,
more efficient than the older aircraft they replace. By the time an
aircraft is replaced, the new model is typically twenty percent more
efficient.87 Airlines ordinarily operate aircraft for at least twenty years,
however.88 This means that the annual efficiency benefits of regular
fleet turnover occur at less than one percent.89

82. Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 3, 25.
83. These figures are based on a study of 3336 takeoff events at London

Heathrow airport. George S. Koudis et al., Airport Emissions Reductions from
Reduced Thrust Takeoff Operations, 52 TRANSP. RES. PART D 17, 27 (2017).
84. Continuous Descent Approaches, AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP,
http://aviationbenefits.org/case-studies/continuous-descent-approaches/
[https://perma.cc/67VR-DTYW] (last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
85. Id.
86. Efficient Descent Advisor (EDA), NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN.
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.aviationsystemsdivision.arc.nasa.gov/
research/tactical/eda.shtml [https://perma.cc/L85L-ESLS].
87. Id. at 132.
88. D.I.A. Poll, 21st Century Civil Aviation: Is it On Course or Is It OverConfident and Complacent?—Thoughts on the Conundrum of Aviation and the
Environment, 121 AERONAUTICAL J. 115, 131–32 (2017).
89. Id. at 133
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Radically novel design concepts have the potential to vastly improve
the rate at which an airline’s fleet efficiency increases.90 Fully electric
aircraft would provide the most dramatic decrease in emissions,
eliminating the need for nearly all fossil fuel combustion if the electric
grid is decarbonized.91 These aircraft currently exist, but because they
use electric power to turn a propeller and carry heavy batteries, electric
planes are much slower than their fossil-fueled counterparts.92
Matching the energy stored in a Boeing 787 Dreamliner’s 223,000
pounds of jet fuel would take four and a half million pounds of
batteries—so energy storage technologies will need to improve before
electric planes become a major component of the world’s fleet.93
Despite the current need for further technological advancement, it is
already evident that electric aircraft and fully solar planes will
eventually be a critical part of a sustainable future for civil aviation. In
2016 Solar Impulse created the first fully solar aircraft to fly around
the world.94 That flight averaged only forty-seven miles per hour,95 but
the project’s founders claim that passengers will fly in solar planes
within the next ten years.96 Many other firms are actively working to
realize fully electric short-range passenger aircraft. For example,
Wright Electric is partnering with EasyJet to develop a batterypowered 120-passenger aircraft capable of traveling over 300 miles.97
Airbus is designing fully-electric, hybrid, and small-scale vertical
take-off aircraft that, in addition to reducing carbon emissions, could
90. See generally Schilling et al., supra note 82.
91. Id. at 7. We say that these designs would nearly, rather than completely,

eliminate fossil fuel consumption to acknowledge the use of fossil fuels in the
manufacturers supply chains and in the materials from which an aircraft is composed,
even for aircraft that are ultimately all-electric.
92. See Samantha Masunaga, No flying Tesla? That’s because electric planes are
a steeper challenge than electric cars, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 9, 2016, 6:00AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-electric-aircraft-20160830-snap-story.html
[https://perma.cc/L2V6-KK2F].
93. Id.
94. Victoria Bryan, Solar Impulse founder sees electric passenger plane in 10
years, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-airlines-techsolar-impulse-idUSKBN13X0TD [https://perma.cc/3GUS-5F2P].
95. Masunaga, supra note 93.
96. Bryan, supra note 95.
97. Angela Monaghan, EasyJet says it could be flying electric planes within a
decade, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/
sep/27/easyjet-electric-planes-wright-electric-flights [https://perma.cc/E987-682G].
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reduce infrastructure needs on the ground.98 And Boeing engineers
working through a NASA contract are exploring a wide range of
alternative aviation fuel concepts, including advanced batteries, hybrid
battery-gas turbine propulsion, and many others.99
Advanced wing shape designs can offer significant efficiency gains
as well, and these opportunities can be realized with or without
transitioning to solar power. Two main innovations show substantial
promise to increase aircraft efficiency: blended wing body designs and
strut-braced wings. Unlike conventional designs that use wings to lift
a tube-shaped fuselage, blended wing body designs use the entire body
of the aircraft as a lifting surface.100 These types of designs could
reduce the carbon intensity of a given aircraft by nearly fifty percent.101
The key challenges for widely adopting blended wing body designs
are infrastructure constraints that limit wingspan, production systems
that are geared toward traditional designs, and ground services that
would need to adapt to different aircraft needs.102
Strut-braced wing aircraft can also be designed more efficiently than
traditional designs, but they would require changes in airport support
and may exceed wingspan maximums dictated by ground services.103
These aircraft use a wider wing to create more lift with less power,
supported by a brace that makes up for the added stress of having a
longer wing.104 Airport services would have to be changed to
accommodate these aircraft, but they can be twenty-nine to sixty-two
percent more efficient than traditional designs.105

98. Airbus, Future of electric flight, AIRBUS (June 18, 2017), http://www.airbus.
com/newsroom/topics-in-focus/electrification.html
[https://perma.cc/ZE2VTYMW].
99. See MARTY K. BRADLEY & CHRISTOPHER K. DRONEY, SUBSONIC ULTRA
GREEN AIRCRAFT RESEARCH PHASE II: N+4 ADVANCED CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT,
NASA/CR–2012-217556 3 (2012), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.
gov/20120009038.pdf.
100. See Schilling et al., supra note 82, at 8.
101. Id. at 7.
102. See id. at 8.
103. See id. at 8.
104. See id at 2.
105. Id.
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3. Renewable Fuels
Alternative fuels derived from renewable sources are another
option.106 The easiest alternative fuels to adopt are those that resemble
fossil-derived fuels closely enough to not require major technology or
infrastructure changes.107 Ensuring that production of these fuels does
not diminish their net mitigation potential is critical, since even though
they are renewable, they have land-use and transportation
implications.108 Acknowledging this problem, governments have set a
variety of standards for how significant a biofuel’s carbon reduction
must be.109 Further, ASTM International published a standard
specifically for aviation fuel containing synthesized standards.110 As
of 2016, five production methods have met its specifications.111
The net emissions of biofuels depends on which production method
is used and can vary significantly.112 Still, the opportunity presented
by using renewable biofuels in civil aviation is substantial—one recent
study suggested that if carbon capture during the fuel production
process is credited to the use of biofuels, their use would result in net
106. In its 2016 environmental report, the ICAO recognized that “[t]he use of
sustainable alternative fuels is an important element of the basket of measures for
reducing aviation’s impact on the global climate and also on air quality.” INT’L CIVIL
AVIATION ORG, 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 153 (2016), http://www.icao.int/
environmental-protection/Documents/ICAO%20Environmental%20Report%
202016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT].
107. See generally BAILIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 5–35 (describing methods of
producing drop in fuels that resemble kerosene-based jet fuel).
108. Id. at 35 (“There is broad consensus that GHG emissions reductions resulting
from the use of alternative fuels should be calculated on a life-cycle basis, . . .
[which] includes recovery and extraction, transport of raw materials, refining and
processing, transport of the finished product, and combustion.”).
109. See id. at 36 (comparing US, EU, California, and Roundtable on Sustainable
Biomaterials standards for biofuel’s minimum GHG reductions).
110. Standard Specification for Aviation Turbine Fuel Containing Synthesized
Hydrocarbons, ASTM INT’L, https://compass.astm.org/EDIT/html_annot.cgi?
D7566+16b [https://perma.cc/N9B2-W8VE] (last visited Apr. 21, 2017)
111. 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 153 (“Today, there are
five pathways that have been approved under ASTM D7566 for producing
alternative jet fuel and two airports are providing significant quantities of biofuel to
their customers . . . .”).
112. BAILIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 45 (“The magnitude of cumulative emission
reductions that could result from the use of [this growing supply] of aviation biofuel
between 2020 and 2035 depends on the specific pathways and feedstocks used.”).
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negative emissions.113 More conservative estimates are nevertheless
optimistic, suggesting that biofuels could reduce an aircraft’s
emissions from twenty-five to seventy-five percent.114
Price is a key barrier to more widespread use of biofuels however.
The ICAO recently reported that “[t]he most significant challenge
affecting the demand for alternative fuels is the tremendous price gap
between conventional fuels and biofuels for civil aviation. Suppressed
demand for alternative aviation fuels then, in turn, limits the
investment in biorefineries that is needed in order to scale up
production.”115
4. Demand Reduction
The ICAO’s preferred avenue for mitigating civil aviation emissions
is through new technologies, operational efficiencies, and alternative
fuels.116 But reducing demand for air travel is another way that direct
reductions in emissions could occur. Given the profit motives of civil
aviation firms, it is not surprising that specific estimates about the
extent to which demand reduction can mitigate civil aviation emissions
are rare, but emissions reductions will arise if it is possible to reduce
demand. Several proposals have argued that demand reduction is in
fact the only effective way in the long run to reduce civil aviation
emissions enough to meet the climate stabilization goals described in
the Paris Agreement.117
113. Marshall Wise, Matteo Muratori & Page Kyle, Biojet Fuels and Emissions
Mitigation in Aviation: An Integrated Assessment Modeling Analysis 52 TRANSP.
RES. PART D 244, 252 (2017) (“In our analysis, the production of biojet fuels with
CCS leads to net negative carbon emissions for each unit of fuel produced. The net
negative emissions partially offset the carbon emissions from fossil fuel use, and the
viability of CCS greatly enhances the mitigation potential of biojet fuels.”).
114. BAILIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 45 (“using the HEFA pathway with lowerperforming soy, rapeseed and jatropha, for example . . . we assume that replacing jet
fuel with these fuels reduces CO2 emissions by 25% . . . [using different underlying
materials with the same HEFA pathway] yields average CO2 reductions of 75%.”).
115. 2016 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 153.
116. See Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Resolution. A39-3, para. 2 (Oct. 2016)
[hereinafter Res. A39-3] (“[The ICAO] affirms the preference for the use of aircraft
technologies, operational improvements and sustainable alternative fuels that
provide the environmental benefits within the aviation sector.”).
117. See, e.g., Philip Cafaro, Reducing Consumption to Avert Catastrophic Global
Climate Change: the Case of Aviation, NAT. SCI. 99 (2013) (“[I]n the real world,
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II. PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
In light of the substantial contributions of global civil aviation to
climate change and the options available to reduce those contributions,
an obvious first question is what international, national, and
subnational public governance initiatives can do to reduce civil
aviation emissions. This Part describes barriers to international public
governance efforts, the status of the general international legal
framework for addressing climate change, and the specific government
regulatory instruments that have targeted civil aviation. Governments
face many challenges regulating carbon emissions that are not unique
to the civil aviation sector, including economic interests that favor
fossil fuel use, domestic collective action problems, and deep
worldview differences. These challenges have been fully described in
the literature, 118 and we focus here on the particular challenges posed
by civil aviation.
A. Challenges to International Public Governance
The transnational character of civil aviation creates several
significant challenges for public-governance-based approaches. It
almost goes without saying that the jurisdiction of national
governments ends at national boundaries, limiting the extent to which
nation states can coerce other nations and private actors outside its
borders to reduce emissions.119 In addition, a collective action problem
right now, people need to fly less, in order to avert catastrophic global climate
change.”); Andrew Macintosh & Lailey Wallace, International Aviation Emissions
to 2025: Can Emissions be Stabilized Without Restricting Demand?, 37 ENERGY
POL’Y 264, 272 (2009) (“Stabilizing international aviation emissions at level
consistent with risk averse climate targets without restricting demand will be
extremely difficult.”); Benoît Chève et al., Will Technological Progress be Sufficient
to Stabilize CO2 Emissions from Air Transport in the Mid-Term?, 28 TRANSP. RES.
PART D 91 (2013) (answering the article’s titular question in the negative).
118. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1154–
1234 (2009) (discussing challenges of climate change to public governance);
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Kaitlin T. Raimi, Climate Change: Leveraging Legacy,
42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 139, 145–70 (2014) (discussing worldview-based challenges and
the socio-temporal trap).
119. See Timothy William Waters, “The Momentous Gravity of the “State of
Things Now Obtaining”: Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global
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arises at the international level.120 Emissions from any one country will
affect the global climate, so no single national government, however
motivated to lead the way, can fully resolve the climate problem.121
Absent an international agreement that incorporates all major emitters
and creates motivations for compliance, a danger exists that free-rider
states could decline to impose limits on aircraft that operate within
them, while still enjoying a reduced risk of suffering climate harms.
These problems are exacerbated by the difficulty of determining which
state should be assigned responsibility for flights between countries
and over international waters.
Because many states see binding international regulation as an
affront to their national sovereignty, an additional barrier stands in the
way of reducing civil aviation emissions.122 The fear that strong

Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25, 33 (2009) (“The remembered
Westphalian system was marked by the factual existence of (and normative support
for) self-legitimating states, whose people and processes were their own concern.”);
see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the
Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 534 (2009) (“No global
“state” has authority to adopt mandatory regulations or impose sanctions. States are
jealous of their sovereignty and freedom of action, and resist delegating authority to
international institutions.”).
120. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental
Law: The Role of Private Climate Governance, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 382, 384–
85 (2015) (“As to the problems of today, climate change is simply different from
earlier threats. Whether it is ‘the mother of all collective action problems’ or just the
most challenging collective action problem, no environmental threat addressed by
the statutory framework erected in 1970–1990 matches climate change in the
magnitude and irreversibility of the potential harm . . . .”)
121. See generally Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex
for Climate Change, The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements:
Discussion Paper No. 2010–33 (“Climate change is politically a difficult problem for
three fundamental reasons. First, it is a global problem, whose solution cannot be
achieved through the efforts of any single state or small group of states.”); Daniel H.
Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, 2 CLIMATE L. 395, 398
(2011) (“Even when global governance is necessary, institutions established at the
international or global level are never sufficient, by themselves, for successfully
resolving global problems.”).
122. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex
for Climate Change, 88 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 543 (2012) (“Even voluntary norms
addressing private actors can reduce state control of domestic economic activity or
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international conventions undermine national autonomy has famously
motivated the United States’ failure to ratify the Convention on the
Law of the Sea.123 International aviation is, by definition, transport
among different nations—each of which enjoys “complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”124 Further,
“[a]ircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are
registered.”125 Thus no individual state can set environmental
guidelines for civil aviation generally. And although a national or subnational government could impose limits on the aircraft in its own
registry, or on the aircraft that visit its airports, doing so will come at
a political and economic cost.126
The challenge to international action is further complicated by the
mismatch between when mitigation expenditures may occur and when
the benefits will occur. The greatest harms of climate change will not
occur in the near-term but will instead be felt by future generations.127
As a result, there is a tendency to undervalue the importance of those
effects, particularly when confronting global disparities in economic
development.128 At the same time, delays in national and international
be perceived as invading sovereignty; they are sometimes opposed even by
governments generally favorable to environmental action.”).
123. See, e.g., James L. Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea, 24 VA.
J. INT’L L. 785, 785–86 (1984) (arguing that “President [Reagan] correctly viewed
the seabed mining provisions in the proposed Convention as clearly inconsistent with
vital national interests [and he] was unwilling to compromise those interests for the
sake of world opinion or American participation in a global regime . . . .”).
124. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 art. 1 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
125. Id. art 17.
126. To the extent that stricter environmental requirements raise costs for civil
aviation, they can provide an incentive not to register in a particular state, to raise
passenger fees for flights into an environmentally-restrictive state, or otherwise
penalize an outlier jurisdiction.
127. See Keohane & Victor, supra note 122, at 9 (“[T]he negative effects of
climate change are not observable now, but are only expected to occur some years
into the future. It is therefore an intergenerational problem: present generations are
expected to pay costs for the benefit of their successes two or more generations into
the future. . . . [and] costs borne today are in the interests of successor generations.”)
128. Vandenbergh, supra note 121, at 385 (“Psychologists tell us that near-term,
vivid, local events are most likely to affect beliefs, norms and behavior, but the most
certain and most severe climate events are far easier to project over a long-term and
global scale.”)
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action are important because current carbon emissions are locking in
climate and sea level effects for hundreds or thousands of years. Thus,
even though the ultimate costs of mitigating the effects of climate
change will be very large and are being locked in now (absent the
development of low-cost carbon removal technologies), the bulk of
those costs will not arise until well into the future. Even if they use an
extremely low discount rate, opponents of near-term action may argue
that little present expense is justified in avoiding even very large longterm harms.129 Coupled with uncertainties about the ultimate cost of
public governance, these economic uncertainties complicate
international negotiations,130 and suggest that a dramatic increase in
public pressure or political will to undertake public governance is
unlikely, at least in the near term.
On a related note, deep differences exist about the distribution of
responsibility for civil aviation emissions reductions among nation
states. Individual states have varying degrees of willingness and
capacity to enforce environmental regulations, and debates about the
respective responsibilities of the developed and developing nations
have emerged regarding civil aviation as they have regarding other
sources of carbon emissions. A recent analysis identified the deep
divide between developed and developing countries as an important
challenge to action on civil aviation at the international level.131
Similar collective action, temporal, justice and other problems arise at
129. Id. (“The value of the climate change harms that will be avoided in future
centuries is miniscule in the calculus after the application of almost any non-zero
discount rate.”)
130. Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer, & Bryce Rudyk, Building A More
Effective Global Climate Regime Through A Bottom-Up Approach, 14 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 273, 280 (2013) (“[U]uncertainties regarding mitigation costs and
future economic conditions, which together make many governments reluctant or
unwilling to make legally binding international treaty commitments to achieve major
quantified reductions five to ten years in the future.”); Daniel H. Cole, The Problem
of Shared Irresponsibility in International Climate Law, in DISTRIBUTION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 290, 293 (André Nollkaemper & Dov
Jacobs, eds. 2015) (“Uneven distribution of costs and benefits expected from
moderate climate change reduces incentives for wide sharing of responsibility.”).
131. MARKUS W. GEHRING & CAIRO A. R. ROBB, ADDRESSING THE AVIATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE 11-12 (2013), https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/
files/research/2013/08/addressing-the-aviation-and-climate-change-challenge.pdf.
As Gehring & Robb note, the EU acted unilaterally after not being satisfied with the
ICAO efforts. Id. at 12, 15.
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the national and subnational levels, but as we mentioned above these
problems have been discussed at length elsewhere.132
In total, these challenges make it unlikely that a general international
agent or a civil aviation-focused international agent with adequate
targets and participation by all major emitting countries will emerge in
the next decade.133 Nevertheless, substantial progress has been made
by ICAO as a result of the availability of low-cost carbon offsets. The
following overview of existing public governance reflects the
challenges that the existing regime has confronted in attempting to
reduce carbon emissions from civil aviation.
B. International Initiatives
1. Aviation in International Climate Governance
The negotiation of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was a watershed moment for
international action on climate.134 But in the decades that have
followed, consensus has developed that it has been unsuccessful at
“achieving its lofty goal to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system . . . .”135
132. See Abbott, supra note 123.
133. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle:

Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 57–58 (Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds. 2009)
(“[S]tates as a group vary greatly in their will and capacity to regulate. Some
governments are captured or corrupt. Governments in developing countries . . . often
view regulation as a tradeoff against economic growth, and lack the information,
resources and technical competence to manage complex regulation.”); Stewart et al.,
supra note 131, at 280 (“Domestic priorities and political circumstances in many
major MEF jurisdictions, together with the difficulties in securing adequate
compliance assurance arrangements to deal with free-riding, are major reasons for
the lack of progress.”)
134. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
135. TRUXAL, supra note 26, at 130 (“[T]he consensus view is that to date the
UNFCCC process has generally delivered ‘inadequate results,’ owing to what many
consider to be an overly ambitious approach.”); Timothy Meyer, How Local
Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1937, 2012
(2015) (“The twenty-first century is one of disillusionment with global institutions.
No longer do commentators and politicians hold out hope that the WTO, the
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Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC directed Annex I
parties to address emissions from aviation, but do so through the
ICAO: “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working
through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the
International Maritime Organization, respectively.”136
Accordingly, the 2015 Paris Agreement excluded international
shipping and civil aviation.137 Although these omissions were dubbed
“conspicuous holes” in the days after the Agreement was negotiated,138
their exclusion from the Kyoto Protocol more than a decade earlier
renders their omission in the Paris Agreement unsurprising. Still, the
Paris Agreement did represent some international recommitment to
climate goals,139 and it may facilitate national action on domestic
flights where states choose to include action on domestic aviation in
their individually determined national commitments.140
2. The International Civil Aviation Organization
The core of the international legal system regulating civil aviation is
the Chicago System, named for the Convention on International Civil
UNFCCC, or the UN Security Council will serve as the primary fora in which to
resolve global challenges.”).
136. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 2.2, Dec. 11, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1.
137. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.
138. Benjamin Hulac, Rules for ship, airplane emissions left out of Paris deal,
CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2015/12/14/
stories/1060029447 [https://perma.cc/LB79-ZZFP].
139. Despite being hailed as a significant step toward meaningful international
climate action, commenters have severe disappointment about what the Paris
Agreement actually accomplished. See, e.g., George Monbiot, Grand promises of
Paris climate deal undermined by squalid retrenchments, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2015/dec/12/
paris-climate-deal-governments-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/5XW8-UW72].
140. Top 3 misconceptions about CORSIA, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/
environmental-protection/Pages/A39_CORSIA_FAQ6.aspx (last visited Apr. 23,
2017) (“Emissions from domestic aviation are considered under the UNFCCC.
Therefore, Parties to the UNFCCC have the possibility of addressing these emissions
in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, as
part of their actions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from domestic
sources.”).
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Aviation (“Chicago Convention” or “Convention”), signed in Chicago
in 1944.141 The Chicago Convention established an international air
law, and constituted the ICAO.142 In its original form, the Chicago
Convention contained a number of core principles that remain
important today. In Article 12, the signatories agreed that each nation
state would adopt measures to ensure that both aircraft registered in
the state and foreign aircraft flying within its territory would comply
with the state’s rules and regulations.143 In support of this ambition,
the parties agreed to endeavor to keep their regulations uniform to the
greatest extent possible.144 In the same article, the parties agreed to
extend the Convention’s rules to flights over the high seas.145 Under
the original convention, aircraft have the nationality of the state in
which they are registered,146 and must possess a certificate of
airworthiness issued by its registering state.147 The Convention also
established the ICAO, one purpose of which was to “[m]eet the needs
of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical
air transport . . . .”148
Each of those provisions has survived to the most recent ninth
edition of the Convention.149 With 190 states now within the
Convention, it enjoys nearly universal membership.150 ICAO
addresses civil aviation emissions in a number of ways, including
facilitating research, promulgating standards, policies and guidance on
aircraft noise, emissions, and operations.151 The ICAO’s most
prominent action to address the industry’s climate implications is its
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Chicago Convention, supra note 125.
Id.
Id. art 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. art 17.
Id. art 31.
Id. art 43–44(d).
ICAO, Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc 7300/9
(2006).
150. Convention on International Civil Aviation – Doc 7300, ICAO (last visited
Apr.
19,
2017),
http://www.icao.int/publications/Pages/doc7300.aspx
[https://perma.cc/36BG-3S66].
151. Environmental Protection, ICAO (last visited Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.
icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S6LE383U].
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Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
(CORSIA), adopted in October 2016.152
3. CORSIA
CORSIA’s target is to freeze carbon dioxide emissions beginning in
2020 levels, and to phase in a system offsetting emissions above those
levels, except where special circumstances render the requirement too
burdensome.153 In its initial formulation, CORSIA does not
specifically designate which offsets will satisfy the program, but it
notes that “emissions units generated from mechanisms established
under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are eligible for use in
CORSIA.”154 This offsetting scheme will be implemented in stages,
beginning with voluntary pilot and first phases that will run from 2021
through 2023,155 and 2024 to 2027 respectively.156 The program
becomes mandatory for member states in 2027, except for Least
Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States, and
Landlocked Developing Countries.157 The United States is currently a
signatory to the Chicago Convention and has committed to joining the
voluntary first phase of CORSIA.158 In light of the history of the
United States with agreements that acknowledge different
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Res. A39-3, supra note 117.
Id. para. 5.
Id. para. 21.
Id. para. 9(a).
Id. para. 9(b).
Id. para. 9(e).
LEADERS’ STATEMENT ON A NORTH AMERICAN CLIMATE, CLEAN ENERGY,
AND ENVIRONMENT PARTNERSHIP (June 29, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/leaders-statement-north-americanclimate-clean-energy-and-environment [https://perma.cc/5GB3-CZNW] (“We
support the adoption by all countries in 2016 of the market-based measure proposed
through the International Civil Aviation Organization to allow for carbon-neutral
growth from international civil aviation from 2020 onwards and will join the first
phase of the measure adopted.”). Although the present administration does not
appear to have publicly spoken on whether the United States remains committed to
joining the first phase of the measure, the Federal Aviation Administration’s 2018
Fiscal Year Business Plan, published in March of 2018, includes an activity target
that suggests continued work toward domestic implementation of CORSIA: “Initiate
domestic implementation of CORSIA Standard and Recommended Practices, once
available from ICAO.” FAA, FY2018 APL BUSINESS PLAN 17, https://www.faa.gov/
about/plans_reports/media/2018/apl_business_plan.pdf.

90

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

responsibilities for certain parties, the extent to which the United States
will continue to support CORSIA is unclear.159 Further, since the
United States has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, it has less
incentive to meet the CORSIA goals.160
In adopting CORSIA, the ICAO acknowledged that new
technologies, operational improvements, and alternative fuels—
apparently even in light of existing efficiency incentives for airlines—
are not delivering sufficient emissions reductions: the environmental
benefits from aircraft technologies, operational improvements and
sustainable alternative fuels may not deliver sufficient CO2 emissions
reductions to address the growth of international air traffic, in time to
achieve the global aspirational goal of keeping the global net CO2
emissions from international aviation from 2020 at the same level.161
Thus the function of the CORSIA offset program is “to complement
a broader package of measures to achieve the global aspirational
goal”162 of freezing civil aviation emissions at 2020 levels, and to do
so without imposing an “inappropriate economic burden on
international aviation.”163

159. This imbalance ultimately led the United States to reject the Kyoto Protocol,
based on its inclusion of different requirements for developing country parties. See
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted) (“[T]he United States should not be a
signatory to any protocol [which would] mandate new commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same
compliance period.”). President Trump’s comments suggest that his administration
shares this attitude toward climate commitments. See Megan Darby, Trump
complains US share of climate finance is unfair, CLIMATEHOME (Apr. 28, 2017),
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/04/28/trump-complains-us-shareclimate-finance-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/ZHC7-V9DV].
160. See Valerie Volcovici, U.S. submits formal notice of withdrawal from Paris
climate pact, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unclimate-usa-paris/u-s-submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climatepact-idUSKBN1AK2FM [https://perma.cc/DW5F-3ESK].
161. Res. A39-3, supra note 117, para 3.
162. Id. para 4
163. Id.
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4. ICAO and CORSIA Limitations
CORSIA confronts several shortcomings, and commenters have
been quick to point out its limitations.164 The scheme’s target of
stabilizing emissions at 2020 levels allows emissions to continue to
grow until that time and fails to provide an incentive for civil aviation
to further reduce its emissions. The scheme’s reservations are a further
barrier—until 2027 participation is voluntary.165
The goal of CORSIA— freezing civil aviation emissions from all
participating states at 2020 levels— is valuable, but it is insufficient if
the objective is for civil aviation to bear its proportionate share of the
reductions necessary to avoid a substantial risk of exceeding the 2
degree goal included in the Paris Agreement, much less than 1.5 degree
aspiration.166 For instance, the 1.5 degree target requires that global
emissions peak no later than 2020, but emissions must also decrease
steeply in the years following, not stabilize at 2020 levels as provided
for in CORSIA.167 Thus the implicit assumption built into CORSIA is
that other sectors will reduce emissions even more significantly than
civil aviation, and that civil aviation will comprise an increasingly
large portion of total anthropogenic carbon emissions. The decision to
use offsetting is therefore only a near-term response that buys time for
long-term progress toward a carbon-neutral civil aviation sector.168
164. James Beard, A global climate deal for aviation! So what next?,
CLIMATEHOME (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/10/11/aglobal-climate-deal-for-aviation-so-what-next/
[https://perma.cc/354B-3PTS]
(“Here are the bad points: It’s just offsetting. And so it doesn’t send a strong price
signal to the industry to innovate or to passengers to fly less. It’s nice-sounding target
of “carbon neutral growth from 2020” (CNG2020) is actually pretty weak, and ICAO
is only set to achieve around three quarters of that goal (so far).”).
165. CARBON MARKET WATCH, THE CORSIA: ICAO’S MARKET BASED
MEASURE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE (2016), http://carbonmarketwatch.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Post-Assembly-Policy-Brief-Web-1.pdf [hereinafter
CORSIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE].
166. Id. at 2; Paris Agreement, supra note 138, art. 2.
167. Johan Rockström et al., A Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization, 335 SCI.
MAG. 1269, 1269 (2017).
168. CORSIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE, supra note 166, at 2 (“For each
additional ton of CO2 emitted, offsetting reduces that ton in another location, a zerosum exercise that balances out the carbon entering the atmosphere. However, if the
reduction lacks environmental integrity . . . there is an overall increase of emissions
in the atmosphere.)
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Aside from CORSIA’s specific limitations, more fundamental
limitations hinder the effectiveness of any ICAO action to reduce
carbon emissions from civil aviation. The ICAO is the
intergovernmental organization tasked in part with reducing emissions
from civil aviation,169 but it lacks enforcement tools. Since an ICAO
resolution is not automatically binding, it will have to be implemented
through later-promulgated standards.170 ICAO resolutions are thus
difficult to enforce for at least four reasons. First, a state may hesitate
to enforce obligations on its own air carriers if other states refuse to
follow suit.171 Second, differences in enforcement capacity may
generate different enforcement outcomes even if states intend to apply
standards uniformly.172 Third, a state that determines that it is
impracticable to comply with an ICAO standard may simply choose
not to do so.173 And fourth, although the Chicago Convention allows a
state to deny an air carrier entry if that carrier has breached an
obligation, that extraordinary remedy has never been invoked.174 In
short, although the ICAO represents a step forward by the international
public governance regime, it has adopted a goal that is modest at best,
is unlikely to be achieved until 2027 at the earliest and will be subject
to substantial enforcement challenges along the way.

169. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 137, art. 2.2.
170. Alejandro Piera, Designing the Legal Form of a Global Aviation Market

Based Measure, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 144, 145 (2016).
171. Id. at 145; see also supra Section III.A.
172. See Piera, supra note 171, at 145. (“States may exercise different levels of
enforcement (e.g. different levels of monetary sanctions), leading to market
distortions.”).
173. Pamela Campos, Compliance Tools for a Global Market Based Measure for
International Aviation, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 153, 157 (2016) (“States are
not categorically required to follow or implement standards. If a State “finds it is
impracticable to comply in all respects,” to “bring its own regulations or practices
into full accord,” or “deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing
in any particular respect” from a standard, it can establish differing regulations, as
long as it provides notification to ICAO.”) (quoting Chicago Convention, supra note
125, art. 38).
174. Campos, supra note 174, at 157.
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III. PRIVATE GOVERNANCE OPTIONS
Private governance provides additional options for reducing the
climate effects of civil aviation. International governmental
organizations can claim authority derived from their association with
national governments and international agreements, but they move
slowly and have limited capacity to set and enforce adequate
standards.175 Private governance initiatives can bypass many of the
barriers that make civil aviation so difficult for public governance. In
Part III, we examine several existing and potential new private
initiatives and explain why they can motivate climate mitigation
efforts despite these barriers. As noted earlier, the term civil aviation
refers to the commercial transport of both passengers and freight. We
focus here on the opportunity for private governance regarding
passenger travel, but air freight has already been the subject of several
private initiatives, and we believe that it is worthy of additional efforts.
Although we identify private governance examples here,
development of a comprehensive agenda is beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, we recommend formation of a multi-stakeholder
panel to develop such an agenda. The panel could include
representatives from the civil aviation industry, advocacy and service
groups, philanthropists, affected sectors such as finance and travel
services, and employee and community groups. It could conduct a
rigorous study of the opportunities for private initiatives to achieve
emissions reductions, identify gaps in current private initiatives, and
propose new initiatives to pursue the most promising opportunities.
A. The Emerging Understanding of Private Ordering
Why is private governance well-situated to fill some of the gaps in
public governance regarding civil aviation? In the last several decades,
social scientists have demonstrated that private actors sometimes
organize in ways that perform governmental functions. For instance,
more than a decade ago Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern
pointed to a large and growing literature suggesting that Garrett
Hardin’s vision of the tragedy of the commons, which is commonly

175. Piera, supra note 171, at 148 (“Just like most international organizations,
ICAO has no enforcement authority in a strict legal sense.”) (citations omitted).

94

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

thought to require a government response, is not inevitable.176
Research pioneered by Ostrom and others demonstrated that resources
can be sustainably managed without traditional government
intervention when they can be monitored at low cost, their users are
embedded in strong social networks that have effective means of
excluding outsiders, and rule enforcement is supported by the users
themselves.177 In many cases, these conditions arise when small
groups manage discrete resources, and the most well-known example
involves the informal groups that manage the lobster harvest off the
coast of Maine.178
At first glance, the global civil aviation sector—including airlines,
pilots, manufacturers, and airport operators, among others—appears to
exhibit few of these characteristics. This might suggest that global civil
aviation is a poor candidate for private climate mitigation efforts, but
recent research in law, political science, international relations,
economics and other fields has expanded the early work on private
ordering and has provided insights that explain why a wide range of
private actors at the domestic and global levels can make important
contributions to environmental protection. This research has
demonstrated that private ordering can occur regarding local, regional,
and global environmental issues even when one or more of the Ostrom

176. See Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern
the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1907 (2003) (suggesting that Hardin’s view was
limited by assuming that governmental institutions were the only way to sustain
common pool resources, and that users were trapped in the system without the ability
to create solutions); see also Daniel H. Cole, Advantages of a Polycentric Approach
to Climate Change Policy 5 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 114, 117 (2015) (“That
subglobal negotiations and agreements might not reduce GHG emissions rapidly
enough to forestall the need for adaptation and/or geoengineering is no reason to
maintain an exclusive focus on global policies that have failed and global
negotiations that remain stalled.”).
177. Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, supra note 177, at 1908.
178. Around the time that Ostrom and colleagues were identifying the
characteristics of successful private management of common pool resources,
research in law and economics scholars were noting the role of social norms in
steering the conduct of participants in these types of communities. See, e.g., ROBERT
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (examining the role of social norms in
interactions between farmers and ranchers in Shasta County, California).
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characteristics do not exist,179 and it has focused in recent years on the
private response to climate change.180
In theory a government carbon tax, cap and trade program, or
regulatory scheme could motivate aviation firms to reduce carbon
emissions, and any of these measures could be adopted by the major
emitting nations and coordinated through an international agreement.
Of course, in practice this process has been difficult at best. The Paris
Agreement reflects participation from almost all nations, but it
achieved this level of participation by reducing the expectations of the
participants. On the domestic level, the prospects for adequate federal,
state, and local government action over the next several years are dim
at best.181 Even though polling in the US for much of the last two
decades has indicated that most voters support some type of
government climate mitigation, support for government action on the
issues is not intense, and climate change is among the most polarized
issues.182 As the last two decades have demonstrated, economic and
179. See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 168 (“[A]lthough the global nature of some
problems may vastly increase the number of parties at both ends . . . [f]or some
goods, a small group of large corporate producers exists, as does a small group of
global advocacy groups.”). For examples of early research on private ordering
regarding environmental protection, see Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can
Non-State Global Governance Be Legitimate?: An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 347, 349–50 (2007); David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global
Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 68 (2010); Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests
and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the
Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 433, 433–34 (2003); Marc
Allen Eisner, Private Environmental Governance in Hard Times: Markets for Virtue
and the Dynamics of Regulatory Change, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 489
(2011); Abbott & Snidal, The Governance Triangle, supra note 134; David P. Baron,
Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy, 10 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7 (2001); Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental
Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You Think, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10162 (2001).
180. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 SO.
CAL. L. REV. 905 (2008); VANDENBERGH AND GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, supra
note 5, at 407; Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 11, at 228-34;
JESSICA GREEN, RETHINKING PRIVATE AUTHORITY: AGENTS AND ENTREPRENEURS
IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2013); Stewart et al., supra note 131,
at 274; Cole, supra note 177, at 117; Sarah Light, The Law of the Corporation as
Environmental Law, 71 STANFORD L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
181. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch. 1, 3 & 4.
182. For a discussion, see VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, ch. 3.
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ideologically-motivated interests can block government climate
mitigation measures in the United States even when most voters
express some level of support for these types of measures.
Although private governance initiatives are an option, it is important
to remember that they are not a first-best response: They cannot
achieve the large-scale emissions reductions that a carbon price or an
effective regulatory scheme can achieve.183 At the same time, they are
an important second-best approach because they can bypass the
barriers to government action in the near term by harnessing existing
preferences for mitigation, and can do so at low cost.184 For instance,
companies may be motivated to reduce carbon emissions because they
respond not just to government regulatory pressure regarding climate
change, but also to pressure from retail and corporate customers,
lenders, investors, employees, and others.185 In some cases, companies
can respond to this pressure at low or negative cost by identifying
energy efficiency and other cost-saving opportunities, as the Virgin
Atlantic example suggests. In addition, they can transfer this pressure
for emissions reductions to their suppliers and others around the globe
through supply chain contracting requirements. Furthermore, research
suggests that much of the resistance to climate mitigation is based on
worldview or ideological concerns about big government, and by
relying on actions by the private sector private initiatives may be able
to bypass these concerns, broadening the support for mitigation efforts
to include greater numbers of conservatives and libertarians.186
Developments in the private sector over the last decade also
demonstrate that private governance is not just a theoretical possibility.
For instance, Microsoft recently committed to become carbon neutral

183. Id. at ch. 3 & 4.
184. Id. at ch. 4.
185. For a brief list of drivers of corporate participation in climate initiatives, see

Vandenbergh, The Drivers of Corporate Climate Mitigation, supra note 12, at 29. In
many cases, motivations for increased efficiency exist at both the firm and consumer
level. See, e.g., Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Paul Shrivastava, Beyond Compliance:
Sustainable Development, Business, and Proactive Law, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 417,
420–21 (2015) (“[O]ver the past two decades, corporations have gradually
internalized the importance of sustainable development policies.”).
186. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at Preface (citing studies).
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and achieved that goal within several years.187 Walmart recently
worked with two environmental groups to reduce 28 million metric
tons of emissions from its supply chains, an amount equal to roughly
half of the annual emissions from the U.S. iron and steel sector, and it
has committed to reduce a billion tons by 2030, an amount equal to all
of the emissions from Germany or Japan.188 In other work, one of us
has argued that corporate private governance initiatives can contribute
half a billion tons per year in emissions reductions each year over the
next decade.189 In addition, private initiatives can target other sectors,
including households, religious organizations, civic and cultural
organizations, and colleges and universities, and the total reductions
from private climate governance can reach more than a billion tons per
year. 190
B. Private Governance Options for Civil Aviation
In Part III.B we match several barriers to government civil aviation
efforts with private initiatives that may be able to bypass them. We
start with the barriers at the international level and then turn to barriers
that arise at the national and subnational levels as well.
1. Overcoming International Coordination Problems
As the ICAO discussion in Part II suggests, efforts to adopt
international climate measures for civil aviation are remarkably
difficult. On top of the problems that have plagued the UNFCCC
process generally, the global presence and emissions of civil aviation
make it a particularly challenging area for governments to regulate.
The potential for private initiatives at the global level arises because
they harness market power and resources rather than governmental
authority, allowing them to bypass national boundaries and transfer
pressure and resources for emissions reductions around the world. This
can happen without the need to coordinate among nations and thus
187. See Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets Within
the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41 (2015) (discussing Microsoft’s carbon
commitment and internal carbon tax).
188. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch. 5 (citing Walmart and other
examples).
189. Id. at ch. 1 & 5.
190. Id. at ch. 9.
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without the ability of any one uncooperative government to undercut
the effort. For instance, a retail airline customer in Denmark or
Indonesia can affect the carbon emissions of an airline based in China
for a flight that occurs over international waters, all without any
government participation. Retail and corporate (e.g., company and
group travel) airline markets, air freight markets, and financial markets
are global, as are many supply chains for airplanes, equipment, fuel,
and other goods and services. As a result, private pressure for
emissions reductions can use markets to bypass the barriers posed by
sovereign boundaries.
Environmental requirements in the supply chain contracts of civil
aviation firms provide many avenues through which firms can impose
environmental standards on others without regard to international
boundaries.191 Travel agents, booking services, corporate travel
offices, and organizations that host large conventions can make
travelers’ carbon emissions a criterion in flight selection processes.
Airlines can require that new aircraft meet increasingly stringent
efficiency standards and can promote alternative fuels.
Pressure from socially responsible lenders and investment funds
also can transcend national boundaries.192 Perhaps the best recent
example is the role that CDP has played in creating motivations for
climate mitigation by airlines and other corporations around the world.
CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) uses the influence of
investors with over $100 trillion in assets to induce carbon emissions
191. See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the
State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global
Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 768 (2011)
(“[C]orporations seek to regularize behavior through the application of behavioral
norms or standards generated by other groups-particularly nongovernmental
organizations that certify products and set standards, or standard-setters concerned
with substantive rules for product production and quality.”); Li-Wen Lin, Legal
Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global
Supply Chains As an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 716 (2009) (“[M]ultinational
companies, backed by their strong bargaining power, have transmitted a new legal
order to developing countries through contracting with local suppliers . . . .”);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private
Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007) (concluding that
more than half of the corporations in eight sectors impose environmental supply
chain requirements on their suppliers).
192. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at Preface (citing studies).
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disclosure by a large number of firms around the globe.193 In 2017,
Delta, American Airlines, United, Southwest, Boeing, Airbus,
disclosed climate data to CDP, along with other firms in the civil
aviation sector.194 This disclosure allows investors to determine which
firms are reducing their emissions and motivates the participating
firms to reduce emissions. And by voting their shares in favor of
efficient practices and other carbon-reducing opportunities, corporate
shareholders can exercise a degree of climate-mitigating control over
corporate behavior from within the corporation, all of which can
transcend national boundaries.
Given the importance of offsets to the CORSIA effort, and the
likelihood that offsets will be a part of new private initiatives, private
purchaser standards for offsets, which can address quality concerns,
can play an important role as well. An example is the Gold Standard,
a private standard established by the World Wildlife Fund and other
international groups. The Gold Standard originally focused on
establishing and monitoring best practices for projects under the UN’s
Clean Development Mechanism but has broadened its focus in recent
years.195 This is a topic that is already on the agenda of CORSIA for
the offsets contemplated in CORSIA’s climate program.
As we noted in Part II.A, disagreements between developed and
developing nations have posed a barrier to many international
governmental initiatives, including as the ICAO civil aviation effort.196
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process assigns
developed and developing countries “common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities.” Disputes about the
meaning of this term, however, have hindered the ability of the ICAO
to produce and implement standards that will achieve major emissions
reductions from global civil aviation.197
193. About
Us,
CDP,
https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us
[https://perma.cc/8CEW-WANF] (last visited May 5, 2017).
194. See
CDP,
Companies,
https://www.cdp.net/en/companies
[https://perma.cc/929E-5JFV] (last visited July 10, 2018).
195. Our Purpose, GOLD STANDARD, http://www.goldstandard.org/our-story/
who-we-are [https://perma.cc/XQJ2-Q36L] (last visited July 10, 2018).
196. For a recent overview, see GEHRING & ROBB, supra note 132, discussion at
n.108-110.
197. See, e.g., id. at 11 (concluding that “[a] second major obstacle has been a
political debate about differentiation”).
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Private governance approaches do not provide a silver bullet for this
issue, but they provide new options. To the extent disagreements
between developed and developing countries arise from underlying
concerns about sovereignty, private initiatives may frame issues in
ways that can reduce positional bargaining and enable efforts to focus
on mitigation measures. For instance, market pressure from retail or
other customers that induces an airline to become more efficient may
provoke less resistance than pressure from a foreign government. In
addition, private climate initiatives can subsidize emissions reductions
in developing countries. Carbon offsets can play this role, but a high
profile example of another approach has occurred in another sector:
Apple’s support for the construction of power plants that will generate
2 gigawatts of renewable power in China.198 This low-carbon power
will enable Apple’s Chinese manufacturing operations to reduce their
carbon footprint while subsidizing the transition to a lower-carbon
electric grid in China.199 These types of private initiatives can be
developed for the global civil aviation sector as well. They are unlikely
to resolve debates over climate justice, but they can reduce carbon
emissions in the near term despite the international gridlock.
2. Closing the Efficiency Gap in Operations
In addition to bypassing barriers that arise at the international level,
private initiatives can bypass barriers that confront government efforts
at all levels. For instance, although governments often hesitate to
become involved in the day-to-day operations of firms,200 private
initiatives are particularly promising regarding civil aviation because
large cost savings can be achieved from carbon reduction efforts that
target inefficiencies in firm operations. The Virgin Atlantic example
suggests that a substantial efficiency gap may exist regarding fuel use,
and the ability to root out these types of operating inefficiencies may
provide firms in the sector with motivation to seek out carbon
reduction opportunities.
198. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch. 8.
199. For a discussion, see VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch. 8. As

Gehring and Robb note “[i]t is within the context of this impasse in negotiations
conducted through ICAO to date that the EU acted unilaterally.” GEHRNIG & ROBB,
supra note 132, at 12.
200. An example in the U.S. is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
which was designed to avoid direct involvement in industrial production processes.
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We might assume that corporate self-interest would have motivated
Virgin Atlantic to take cost-effective fuel efficiency steps years ago,201
yet the pilot fuel efficiency study highlights how private initiatives can
accelerate the closing of the gap between the fuel economy steps that
are in the firm’s interest and the firm’s actions.202 Even under the
assumption that the market will eventually incorporate all efficiency
gains that are in the firm’s interest, the Virgin Atlantic example
demonstrates that major, highly profitable efficiency gains are often
not achieved promptly. Virgin Atlantic began operating in 1984, yet it
was not until 2014 that the airline identified a seemingly obvious, easy
way to achieve many fuel cost reductions. A host of reasons could
explain why an airline might not have addressed this principal-agent
problem in the past (e.g., lack of information regarding fuel use, focus
on other issues by management, separation of responsibilities among
different units and employees within the firm, lack of expertise about
or objections to behavioral interventions that include pilots, and
others), but the Virgin Atlantic example demonstrates that pressure for
carbon emissions reductions plus technical assistance from a nongovernmental organization can overcome the existing barriers.203
Moreover, if Virgin Atlantic is in this position, many other airlines
and other firms in the civil aviation sector may be as well. Private
initiatives that combine pressure with expertise also might yield
important emissions reductions from fuel and other inefficiencies in
201. Gosnell et al., supra note 1, at 1 (“fuel use in the industry affects profits—
fuel represents an average 33% of [airlines’] operating costs”).
202. For a brief overview of the debate between economists and engineers about
the size of the efficiency gap, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Keynote: Motivating
Private Climate Governance: The Role of the Efficiency Gap, 70 ARKANSAS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
203. The efficiency gap in aviation may be driven by several factors, including
inefficient operating practices. An example is the inattention to fuel use created by
the principle–agent problem highlighted by the Virgin Atlantic study. Although the
airline has an incentive to reduce fuel consumption, the actors in the best position to
do so are the pilots. If the Virgin Atlantic experience is representative of other
airlines, the pilots historically have not been given incentives to reduce fuel use, and
until the firm felt pressure to reduce carbon emissions management did not focus on
the opportunity to solve the principal-agent problem. Once pilot efficiency
information and monitoring were in place, however, and pilot-level incentives were
introduced, the research suggests that the pilots acted in ways that were more
consistent with their airline principal’s preference for reduced fuel consumption, and
large emissions reductions occurred. See generally Gosnell et al., supra note 1.
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the civil aviation sector and from similar inefficiencies in other sectors.
Studies show that carbon reduction motivations have led to cost
savings in industries ranging from potato chip production to
electronics to big box retail stores, and other transportation sectors
(e.g., trucking) may be particularly promising targets of opportunity.204
3. Accelerating the Development and Uptake of Efficient
Technologies
In addition to programs that target pilot behavior and other
operational aspects of civil aviation firms, private initiatives can
promote the development and uptake of more efficient technologies.
As we discussed in Part I, new fuel-efficient airplane designs are being
developed. A challenge for the civil aviation sector, however, is that
the development and implementation of these new technologies is
proceeding at a slow pace.
Private initiatives can target both the development and uptake of
new technologies through green finance and motivational efforts.
Numerous green finance initiatives have emerged in the last decade
that are designed to reduce the cost of developing and deploying
efficient or low-carbon technologies.205 Aviation technologies that are
not fully developed—like lighter and more efficient batteries that can
facilitate electric aircraft, novel wing designs, and more—may be
hindered by a lack of necessary investment in the underlying research.
The development of more fuel-efficient aircraft may be a natural target
for green finance initiatives.
Green finance initiatives also could target the uptake of more
efficient aircraft, reducing the cost of capital for airlines that accelerate
fleet replacement. Even though new aircraft are already significantly
more efficient than older models, the decades-long effective life of an
aircraft means that absent additional incentives, fleet replacement will
remain gradual. Similarly, a green bond fund could commit to
investing in emerging aircraft biofuel technologies, or in the
infrastructure needed to use biofuels on a large scale.

204. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at ch 5.
205. Charles Di Leva, Financing Climate Mitigation and Adaptation, 11 CARBON

& CLIMATE L. REV. 314, 315-17 (2017) (describing a need to complement
government investment with private sector capital).
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In addition, private advocacy groups can call attention to airlines’
relative carbon emissions. In turn, private investor and lender
initiatives can favor airlines that have taken steps to reduce carbon
emissions and increase efficiency with aging fleets. In recent years,
lending standards have emerged as an important way for banks to
impose environmental requirements on borrowers for projects all
around the world. For example, the Equator Principles are a collection
of disclosure and environmental standards that ninety financial
institutions in thirty-seven countries have voluntarily adopted.206 The
effect of these standards is to impose environmental requirements on
firms and projects that might otherwise be unaffected by national or
international regulation.207 The Carbon Principles are another example
of a private standard designed to address the carbon emissions
associated with lending. The Principles foster enhanced climate
diligence for new fossil-fuel power plants by requiring prospective
borrowers to assess the financial viability of a proposed power plant in
light of climate mitigation risks.208 In addition, the Principles call on
banks to “[e]ncourage clients to pursue cost-effective energy
efficiency, renewable energy and other low carbon alternatives to
conventional generation.”209 The Equator Principles and Carbon
Principles do not require that a less carbon intensive option be selected,
but they require borrowers to identify carbon implications and to
consider lower carbon alternatives. If applied to civil aviation, lending
standards like these could increase airlines’ motivation to invest in
206. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://equatorprinciples.com/about/ (last visited May. 5, 2017).
207. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 4, at 151–52.
The Equator Principles require, for example, that “[f]or all Projects, in all locations,
when . . . [e]missions are expected to be more than 100,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent
annually, an alternatives analysis will be conducted to evaluate less Greenhous Gas
(GHG) intensive alternatives.” THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 6 (2013), http://equatorprinciples.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/equator_principles_III.pdf.
208. Leading Wall Street Banks Establish the Carbon Principles, CITIGROUP (Feb.
4, 2008), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2008/080204a.htm. Specifically,
adherents to these principles agree to “[a]scertain and evaluate the financial and
operational risk to fossil fuel generation financings posed by the prospect of domestic
CO2 emissions controls,” and to “[u]se the results of this diligence as a contribution
to the determination whether a transaction is eligible for financing and under what
terms. THE CARBON PRINCIPLES 2 (2008), http://www.morganstanley.com/
globalcitizen/environment/CarbonPrinciplesFinal.pdf
209. THE CARBON PRINCIPLES supra note 209, at 2
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technologies and infrastructure that will facilitate a more efficient
industry and to take other steps to reduce carbon emissions.
4. Increasing Overall Motivation for Climate Mitigation
In addition to providing resources and motivation to achieve greater
efficiency, private initiatives can create additional motivations for civil
aviation firms to study and reduce their carbon footprints. Firms in the
civil aviation sector are exposed to external and internal drivers for
private governance, such as pressure from retail and corporate
customers, employees, and others. By providing information to retail
and corporate customers about the carbon footprint of air travel,
private initiatives can allow these private actors to express preferences,
even if they are weak preferences, for sustainable travel and can
pressure airlines to compete over the carbon footprint of flights.
Further, private naming-and-shaming and other reputation campaigns
can induce airlines to avoid reputational risks by making efficiency
investments and taking other steps to reduce their carbon footprints.210
In some cases, information initiatives focus less on naming-andshaming campaigns than on providing factual information to affect
decision-making by retail and corporate customers. For instance,
informational initiatives can provide data on the carbon footprint of
particular flights. Many large corporations have adopted carbon
emissions targets and internal carbon taxes,211 so employees who are
210. Reputation campaigns can motivate climate mitigation actions that do not
involve efficiency gains. Contrail reduction, for example, will not directly decrease
an airline’s operating expense. But private reporting schemes that facilitate public
awareness of those efforts can enhance the reputation of the firm, the value of which
can offset bare cost increases encountered from contrail reduction measures.
Although contrail mitigation does not have the same net-zero cost opportunities, the
reputational effect on an airline of reducing emissions might be a net positive.
Research in several corporate studies has demonstrated that firms often pursue costly
climate mitigation steps that are likely to have positive reputational benefits. See
Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social
Responsibility 50 J. ECON LITERATURE 51 (2012) (reviewing economics literature on
corporate sustainability behavior); Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 167 (“Even though
consumer demand, as measured by willingness to pay for green goods, is often
limited, firms also respond to more generalized concerns about firm or brand
reputation.”).
211. Light, supra note 188, at 41 (“Microsoft’s internal carbon fee is a way for the
firm to create incentives to reduce emissions, to force emitting business units or
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booking corporate travel may have increasing incentives to opt for
low-carbon flights.212 A number of companies are already increasing
consumer access to information on the climate effects of individual
and corporate travel decisions. Travel search engines Glooby and
TripZero allow consumers to compare the carbon intensity of flight
options while booking travel.213 TripZero charges hotels a commission
to be searchable through the website, and it uses a portion of those
commissions to purchase offsets against consumer travel.214 In
divisions to acknowledge the “true cost” of using energy, and to raise money for its
emissions-reduction efforts.”).
212. Examples of initiatives of this type in other fields include certification and
carbon reporting schemes. The Marine Stewardship Council, for example, uses a
third party auditing service to prove certifications to fisheries that are deemed
sustainable. See Will Martin, Marine Stewardship Council: A Case Study in Private
Environmental Standard-Setting, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10097,
10097 (2014) (“The story of MSC’s development provides a case study of how
private environmental standard-setters can make change happen, outside the context
of laws and regulation.”). Products that come from these fisheries are able to
advertise their sustainability with a recognizable label, which allows a consumer to
use that sustainability information in making a decision about what to purchase
without having to individually research each product. Products that come from these
fisheries are able to advertise their sustainability with a recognizable label, which
allows a consumer to use that sustainability information in making a decision about
what to purchase without having to individually research each product.
213. GLOOBY, https://www.glooby.com/ (last visited June 11, 2018) (“Glooby is a
travel search engine that enables users to find and compare prices on airplane tickets
and hotels, while indicating the most fuel-efficient flights and eco-labeled hotels. We
search among a variety of travel agencies, airlines and booking sites and show you
all the information you need to make better travel decisions.”); TRIPZERO,
https://www.tripzero.com/ (last visited June 11, 2018) (“At TripZero we believe it’s
our responsibility to protect the planet. So we’ve created a different kind of travel
agency. When you book your hotel with us, we offset the carbon footprint created
by your trip—at no charge to you.”). Similar initiatives exist for hotel bookings as
well. See, e.g., Easily book a green hotel, BOOKDIFFERENT, https://web.archive.org/
web/20170110015310/https://www.bookdifferent.com/en/page/green-hotels/
[https://perma.cc/6X87-QHK8] (last visited June 11, 2018) (“By offering an easy
way to choose a green hotel we hope to increase the number of eco-friendly travelers.
Having more travelers that look for sustainable options will also work as an incentive
for other hotels to go green too.”).
214. Marc Gunther, TripZero: A lean startup tries to ‘green’ the travel industry,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/tripzero-startup-green-travel-industry
[https://perma.cc/T27B-YT6A]
(“[H]otels pay commissions to TripZero for attracting customers. A portion of the
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calculating the emissions generated by a given flight, Glooby takes
into account key efficiency factors such as the type of aircraft
operating on a given route, as well as the seating density on that
particular flight.215 Some individual airlines are making carbon
emissions information available to retail consumers as well. Air New
Zealand, for example, automatically displays the cost of offsetting a
flight when a customer books online and gives the customer the option
of paying for the offset.216
5. Addressing Demand Growth
Government efforts to regulate civil aviation are particularly
difficult because the growing demand for civil aviation is putting and
will continue to put great pressure on the ability of the sector to meet
even modest climate targets. Public and private efforts to lower civil
aviation emissions will buy time, but unless civil aviation can adopt
carbon neutral practices by the second half of this century, demand
growth will continue to undermine emissions reduction efforts. Not
only is demand projected to increase sharply, but the principal
international governmental body that is charged with reducing civil
aviation carbon emissions, the ICAO, arguably has a mandate to
promote the growth of the civil aviation industry, a mandate that is in
competition with, if not superior to, its mandate to reduce carbon
emissions.217
commissions is then deployed to buy carbon offsets, for such projects as the largest
native-species reforestation campaign in Chile’s history, a forest protection project
in Kenya, wind turbines for Indiana schools and a methane capture project on a
Pennsylvania dairy farm. The offsets are certified by reputable third parties,
including the Verified Carbon Standard . . . .”).
215. Michele Herrmann, How To Book Flights Like An Eco-Traveler, EPICURE &
CULTURE (Mar. 1, 2016), https://epicureandculture.com/green-travel-glooby/
[https://perma.cc/7Q3E-54K5] (“With its search results, Glooby calculates certain
factors relating to emission levels for flights, including fuel consumption per aircraft,
number of seats, and cabin class.”)
216. Customer carbon offset programme, Air New Zealand, https://www.
airnewzealand.com/sustainability-customer-carbon-offset [https://perma.cc/SS3N4PTN] (“When booking online, the carbon emissions for your flight(s) and the cost
to offset them is automatically calculated and displayed. If you decide to offset, the
cost of emission units will be added to the total paid for the flight(s).”)
217. See GEHRING & ROBB, supra note 132, at n.106 (noting that Resolution
A36/22 asks Member States to “refrain from environmental measures that would
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Private initiatives are not a silver bullet for the challenge posed by
increasing demand, but they provide new ways to think about the issue.
Private initiatives regarding demand reduction may be perceived as
less intrusive and threatening than government initiatives on the topic.
Several examples already exist. For instance, corporate carbon
commitments that include emissions associated with employee travel
are likely to lead companies to reduce travel when possible. Video
conferencing can reduce the need for travel. Standardization and other
developments in video conferencing equipment and software could
reduce the risk of technical glitches that discourage video
conferencing. Public information campaigns by NGOs could attach
reputational consequences to firms’ decisions to hold conferences or
meetings that require excessive air travel. Similarly, corporate carbon
policies and supply-chain contracts can lessen demand as well by
creating incentives not to use forms of expedited shipping that require
use of aircraft. Of course, private initiatives also rely on the ability to
induce for-profit firms to participate, and it may be hard to tackle
demand issues absent the coercion and resources of government.
6. Addressing Actors Beyond the Civil Aviation Sector
In addition to airlines, other actors play important roles in civil
aviation carbon emissions but are hard to reach through public
governance. For instance, many airports operate without meaningful
competition, and consequently lack strong incentives to express
consumers’ preferences for efficiency and climate mitigation. A recent
International Air Transport Association report examined competition
among airports and found although internet resources give consumers
an unprecedented ability to compare travel options, most still have a
strong preference for traveling from their local airport.218 This
highlights the fact that even where a majority of consumers have a
preference for an airport with reduced carbon emissions, the strong
adversely affect the orderly and sustainable development of international civil
aviation.”). Gehring and Robb observe that “ICAO has been accused of serving ‘as
much, if not more, as a forum for championing causes to preclude the sector from
mandatory measures aimed at reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions as it has for
developing such measures.’” Id. at n.107.
218. JAMES WILTSHIRE, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, AIRPORT
COMPETITION: MYTH OR REALITY? 12 (2017), https://www.iata.org/publications/
economics/Reports/airport_competition_web_2017.pdf.
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competitive position that many airports enjoy may undercut their
managers’ motivations to reduce carbon emissions.219 Advocacy
groups may need to turn to other sources of motivation, such as
bondholders, airlines, and corporate travel to induce airport authorities
to place a higher priority on carbon emissions reductions.
An example of an opportunity for private initiatives is that financing
for airports can include requirements that facilities be constructed in a
way that allows for blended wing body design or strut braced wing
aircraft to obtain necessary ground services. Similarly, biofuel use
could be increased if lending standards required airports to make
alternative fuels available. An example of a recent effort regarding
biofuels is the Carbon War Room’s work to facilitate long-term
investment in sustainable aviation fuels at Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport (“Sea-Tac”).220 In a 2017 report, the Carbon War
Room investigated long-term funding opportunities that would enable
Sea-Tac to increase access to sustainable aviation fuels.221 Reports of
this type provide expertise about the infrastructure needed to support
alternative fuels and can increase confidence that a prospective bio fuel
project will find a market for its fuel.
Although we have identified a number of potential initiatives and
actors, our treatment of the private governance option for civil aviation
is not intended to be comprehensive. Many other initiatives and actors
could play a role in reducing civil aviation’s emissions. In addition, the
analytic framework we have used in this paper could be applied to
other transportation sectors. Comparable initiatives and actors in the
context of shipping, for example, suggest comparable opportunities for
prompt, inexpensive climate mitigation even in the absence of
219. See id. at 5 (“Regulators and policy makers need to be careful not to rely on
airline competition masking the lack of effective competition between airports and
the absence of strong commercial imperatives on airport operators to deliver a good
outcome for consumers and other airport users in terms of price and service
quality.”).
220. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, Innovative Funding for Sustainable Aviation
Fuel at U.S. Airports: Explored at Seattle-Tacoma International, https://www.rmi.
org/insights/reports/innovative-funding-sea-tac-2017/
[https://perma.cc/433UN8XX].
221. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE-CARBON WAR ROOM & SKYNRG,
INNOVATIVE FUNDING FOR SUSTAINABLE AVIATION AT US. AIRPORTS (2017),
https://www.rmi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/RMI_Sustainable_Aviation_
Innovative_Funding_SAF_2017.pdf
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traditional governance at the international, national, or subnational
levels.
CONCLUSION
Civil aviation is becoming an increasingly large part of the total
human influence on the atmosphere. Aviation’s effects on the climate
are increasingly well understood, as are the methods through which
these effects could be mitigated. Much of the industry is international
and its effects are widely dispersed both through time and
geographically, however, and traditional public governance
mechanisms may be inadequate to the challenging task of reducing the
carbon emissions from civil aviation. Without intervention of some
kind, the industry is not on track to play its part in meeting the Paris
Agreement’s climate goals.
Private environmental governance initiatives can complement
existing government efforts and play a direct role in addressing this
problem. Opportunities exist in part because the industry has not
incorporated major existing efficiency opportunities, and absent new
private efforts civil aviation firms lack the motivation and coordinating
ability to take advantage of opportunities on the horizon. A private
climate governance agenda for civil aviation could include the types
of initiatives described here, plus others developed by experts in the
field. The agenda could yield prompt, substantial carbon emissions
reductions from the civil aviation sector and could complement more
comprehensive government action when it occurs.
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APPENDIX A: CARBON EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY222
2015 total
emissions country
rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Country
China
United States
India
Russia
Japan
Germany
South Korea
Iran
Canada
Saudi Arabia
Brazil
Mexico
Indonesia
South Africa
United Kingdom
Australia
Italy
Turkey
France
Poland

2015 total carbon dioxide emissions
from fuel combustion (million metric
tons)
9040.74
4997.50
2066.01
1468.99
1141.58
729.77
585.99
552.40
549.23
531.46
450.79
442.31
441.91
427.57
389.75
380.93
330.75
317.22
290.49
282.40

222. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, supra note 25.

2015 per capita carbon
dioxide emissions from fuel
combustion (metric tons)
6.59
15.53
1.58
10.19
8.99
8.93
11.58
6.98
15.32
16.85
2.17
3.66
1.72
7.77
5.99
15.83
5.45
4.10
4.37
7.34

